Part 2 - Dialectic and the Diabolical
Hegel’s Project – Part Two (2/4)
Hegel's Need
Unlike philosophers such as Aristotle or St. Thomas, whose primary need is for truth, Hegel's fundamental need is for unity. Hegel does not feel compelled to conform his thought to an external reality that is already given, from which he would then deduce the First Cause. His fundamental drive is not to see but to organize into unity. He is uninterested in the multiplicity of beings but rather in the totality (Ganzheit) gathered in the One. In this respect, he resembles Plotinus.
Hegel knows the Absolute is one, but he errs in his attempt to unify being with nothingness, truth with falsehood, and good with evil. We know, instead, that being is opposed to non-being, truth to falsehood, and good to evil. True reconciliation harmonizes the reconcilable, not the irreconcilable. Indeed, it is love for unity, peace, and concord that justifies the opposition of heaven to hell. Hegel serves two masters precisely because his Absolute combines God with the devil.
For Hegel, the goal is not so much to search for, investigate, or discover a preexisting, objective, and transcendent truth. Instead, it is to enter into himself, gain awareness, and clarify or determine that interior truth—or that "something" he already implicitly knows to be present within his "I": God Himself or the Absolute. Truth, for him, is not the true as opposed to the false, but the synthesis of the true and the false. This is his dialectic.
This approach aligns with that of Descartes, previously developed by Kant, Fichte, and Schelling. While Hegel does believe in sensory experience or historical knowledge, he values them only insofar as he sees their data as conceptual and empirical determinations of the Absolute truth already present within him.
For Hegel, truth is being itself, and it is the identity of thought and being, present not only in God but also in everything, for everything is a concept, just as God is the Concept. Everything is dialectical, just as God is dialectical, because being itself is dialectical.
For this reason, Hegel’s goal was not to construct a system of notions ordered around and subordinate to a supreme notion—God, as in Aristotle and St. Thomas. Instead, it was to build a unified philosophical system centered on a single notion, that of Spirit, which reduces everything to unity, reconciles all oppositions, abolishes all separations and mutual exclusions, and embraces everything without excluding anything. How, then, does one mediate between opposites?
No one denies his interest in the theme of being, which is closely tied to the problem of God and gives him a certain resemblance to St. Thomas. But in reality, the true background of his thought is Parmenides, as Hegel himself acknowledged. As in Parmenides, Hegelian being is one, whole, absolute, spirit, necessary, eternal, immutable, and simple.
St. Thomas makes the following observations regarding Parmenides:
"He seems to touch upon unity according to reason, that is, from the standpoint of form. He argues in this way: everything outside of being is non-being; and everything that is non-being is nothing; therefore, everything beyond being is nothing. But being is one. Therefore, everything beyond the one is nothing. This makes it clear that he considered the reason for being to be one, because it cannot be understood that anything can come after being to diversify it, for it is necessary that what comes after being be alien to being. What is such is nothing, and thus it seems it cannot diversify being.
Thus, we see that the differences added to a genus diversify it, but they are beyond its substance. Indeed, the differences do not participate in the genus; otherwise, the difference would belong to the substance of the genus, which would lead to a redundancy in definitions. If the genus were already its substance, adding the difference would be futile, just as it would be if the species were added. Indeed, the difference would not differ at all from the genus. Therefore, it is necessary that what is outside the substance of being be non-being, so it cannot diversify being."[1]
To gather everything into unity, Hegel believes that one must remove all opposites—not only those within the realm of being, such as the finite and the infinite, God and the world, being and becoming, being and thought but also those between being and non-being, true and false, good and evil. Everything is being, even non-being; everything is true, even falsehood; everything is good, even evil. In this sense, Hegel claims that everything is contradictory, opposing Aristotle's principle of identity. Therefore, he cannot avoid opposition in his pursuit of unity—though this opposition is mistaken.
Furthermore, Hegel lacks the Platonic concept of being through participation (μετέχη), which differs from being by essence. He only has the concept of the part relative to the whole—a concept typical of physics and mathematics, which is insufficient in metaphysics, the realm of being. In metaphysics, the notion of part necessitates an analogical understanding, articulated through the concept of being as participated or by participation. Without this, one ends up, like Parmenides, conceiving the universe not as a collection of entities, but as a single, indivisible whole—like a cake or an apple divided into slices.
I observe that the absolutely simple divine whole does not, and does not need to, become finite or divided into parts to give rise to entities, as though they were parts of its being. Nor does the idea of entities outside the infinite being involve any absurd addition or increase to its already perfect and complete infinite being. Instead, the entities possess the being that God possesses by essence, through participation. Thus, God is distinguished from the world, avoiding the pantheism of a god divided into parts.
However, Hegel does not wish to deny becoming, as Parmenides did in the name of the identity of being. Hegel, deeply influenced by Heraclitus, grappled with the challenge of reconciling becoming with identity. Rather than denying becoming, he instead elevated contradiction to the status of the fundamental principle of reality, supplanting identity. Hegel did not forget Descartes either, and for him, being is the sum, the Cartesian I, developed by Kant, Fichte, and Schelling.
On the one hand, Hegel is drawn to Parmenides's ontological univocity and monism, who posits being as one and absolute. On the other hand, recognizing Parmenides' error in rejecting becoming and history, he turns to Heraclitus' account of becoming grounded in contradiction rather than embracing Aristotle's explanation of becoming.
Thus, to preserve becoming, Hegel felt compelled to reject Aristotle’s principle of non-contradiction, asserting that to fully embrace reality, we must not shy away from recognizing the inherently contradictory nature of becoming. However, Hegel likely misunderstood Aristotle’s principle, as evidenced by his efforts to reassure those troubled by his thesis. He is careful to avoid self-contradiction and frequently counters his opponents by exposing contradictions in their reasoning. Alternatively, Hegel’s lack of clarity may stem from the absence of conceptual tools, such as the analogy of being. Without such tools, the reliance on univocity alone can lead to expressions that appear contradictory, even when the intent is to avoid contradiction.
As more astute critics have noted, Hegel contradicts himself in his principles, and this is the reason we reject his pantheistic historicist idealism, without overlooking his merits and good qualities. What is particularly unsettling in Hegel is not so much his improper way of speaking about contradiction, but the impression that he promotes ambiguity, falsehood, hypocrisy, and duplicity.
Indeed, in Hegel’s ethics, the obligation given to us by Christ to say "yes" to what is yes and "no" to what is no, is undermined. Since reality is both yes and no, we no longer have an objective, certain, univocal, and distinct reference. We are no longer bound by reality. For Hegel, reality itself is dialectical; it is both yes and no. The real is rational, and the rational is dialectical—it opposes affirmation to negation. It is not our reason that must mirror reality, but reality itself that reflects our reason.
We are thus granted the ability to say yes to what is no and no to what is yes because it is not reality but we decide the yes and the no of the real. Now, to say that something is what it is not, and not to say that it is what it is, is nothing other than a lie. And to make it appear that what is not, is, and to pretend that what is, is not, is hypocrisy.
Christ says that this belongs to the devil, the liar par excellence. For this reason, we can rightly say that Hegelian dialectics is a diabolical art of deception and fraud, simulation and dissimulation, double meanings, and ambiguity. Christ is so severe against hypocrisy because He wants to keep us safe from the devil's snares.
Hence the duty of sincerity in speaking things as they are. Of course, one can make mistakes unintentionally, but sincerity remains because we did not wish to deceive, but we have deceived ourselves without meaning to. Sincerity, moreover, is not simply saying what one thinks, if that thinking is false, but saying what one truly believes to be true in good faith.
One can also observe in Hegel the tendency to reconcile the irreconcilable—being with non-being, truth with falsehood, good with evil, Christ with Belial, hell with heaven—in such a way that everything becomes one, true, good, eternal, divine, absolute, or rather, that only the absolute exists as the synthesis of everything with everything.
True reconciliation must be made between terms that are reconcilable, which can give rise to a unity or union, and therefore in the horizon of being, truth, and good. To care for true reconciliation requires precisely the care not to confuse what should be kept separate, it requires rejecting what must be rejected, not approving both the true and the false, both the good and the bad, both justice and sin, perhaps under the pretext of "diversity," but rather opposing yes to no and not serving two masters, so as not to fall into duplicity and pretense, which do not bring about concord but hypocrisy and the increase of tensions.
One must avoid rigidities, dualisms, and false oppositions, cultivating instead an appreciation for nuances, gradations, and intermediate tones. The choice is rarely an absolute dichotomy of all or nothing, but rather a discernment between this and that—accepting one, rejecting another. Between white and black lies gray; between summer and winter, spring and autumn. However, it is crucial to distinguish between opposition and contradiction. Opposites share a common subject—for instance, the same room can be cold at one time and warm at another
Contradictory, on the other hand, involves the simultaneous affirmation and negation of the same subject: man and non-man. Such an expression makes no sense. The principle of excluded middle enunciates the same thing: a man either exists or does not exist; there cannot be a third possibility.
The Hegelian synthesis appears to contravene the principle of non-contradiction. While contraries can exist and coexist—for instance, a person can be opposed to me—contradictories are unthinkable, as they mutually exclude one another. It is likely that Hegel, in using the term 'contradictory,' actually refers to contraries or the interaction of opposing forces (the 'negative'), such as those encountered in a conflict or war. Marx, in turn, will adopt this interpretation of 'contradiction' in his reading of Hegelian dialectics
Different beings coexist with one another; there is real being, and there is being of reason. Within being, there are numerous distinctions and mediations. However, between being and non-being, no middle ground exists—no synthesis or 'overcoming' can hold. It is an either-or choice: either being or non-being. One must decide. Evading the issue or attempting to play both sides ultimately proves futile.
Between this and that, within the horizon of being or good, an agreement is possible. However, between yes and no, or between good and evil, no third possibility exists—except the shameful position of the hypocrite, who seeks to serve both God and the devil. One must not confuse 'et-et' with 'aut-aut.' The synthesis proposed by Hegelian dialectics between being and non-being is an imposture, offering only a false semblance of harmony and peace. Beneath this veneer lies an inextinguishable conflict, for it is constitutive of being itself. This, indeed, is the price of Hegelian dialectics.
Like Plato, Hegel was unable to find the explanation, identity, and intelligibility of becoming. It seemed to him like a being that is not. Becoming seems contradictory. Well, Hegel became convinced that it is indeed contradictory. That is how he invented his dialectic based on contradiction.
It is always in order not to give up on his Heraclitean conception of becoming as contradictory that Hegel identified science with dialectics, because this, unlike demonstrative knowledge founded by Aristotle (episteme) and based on identity, allowed space for contradiction.
Hegel did not realize that it was Aristotle who helped us understand the intelligibility of becoming without any need for an impossible contradiction in reality, but rather in full respect of the principle of non-contradiction, allowing us to establish a science of it—specifically, physics—which in turn enables the dominion and use of nature for human needs, and thus the establishment of technology.
As is well known, for Aristotle, becoming is nothing other than the act of being in actuality, transitioning from potentiality to actuality. This implies the two ontological notions of act and potency, which unfortunately eluded Hegel. He had a strong sense of active potency but ignored passive potency, which is necessary to conceive of matter as the subject of form.
Although he had a strong need for the concrete and was sensitive to historical facts, it is difficult to perceive in Hegel the true identity of material substance in its existence independent of the concept, beyond the abstract schemes of dialectics. Although he boasted of a superior perception of becoming compared to Aristotle, Hegel is far from the precise Aristotelian analysis of the various forms of becoming: transformation (metabolè), local motion or movement (kinesis), alteration (alloiosis), diminution (fthyisis), increase (àuxesis), generation (ghenesis), and corruption (fthorà).
With the use of the two notions of potency and act, there is no need—indeed, it is absurd—to resort, as Hegel does, to the opposition of being and non-being, since being and non-being cannot coexist and exclude each other, just as yes and no, affirmation and negation, cannot coexist—similar to the impossibility of reconciliation between God and the devil, even though the devil is a creature of God and God can use the devil's actions for His plans of justice and mercy.
End of Part Two (2/4)
P. Giovanni Cavalcoli OP
Fontanellato, November 2, 2024
Source:
https://padrecavalcoli.blogspot.com/p/dialettica-e-diabolica-il-progetto-di_7.html
Reference:
[1] In XII libros Metaphysicorum, op.cit., p.41.