Dialectic and Diabolical - Fourth Part
Hegel's Project – Fourth Part (4/4)
The Ethical Modality of Hegelian Dialectic
From what has been discussed thus far, it should be clear to the reader that Hegelian dialectic is not to be understood merely as a logical process of concepts, thought, or reason—a mere battle of ideas. Rather, as Hegel explicitly informs us, it must also be grasped as an inexhaustible, restless, spiritual force—creative, formative, and polemical, content with its contradictions and contradicting others. Dialectic is a dynamic process that inherently necessitates the formulation of an antithesis. against which it can contend, for, as we have seen, being itself is antinomic.
The Hegelian dialectic represents a movement of the will directed not toward actual good but toward apparent good. In this context, the deliberate employment of dialectic is far from innocuous, unlike its Aristotelian counterpart, where dialectic serves the pursuit of truth through the comparison of opposing theses.
In Hegelian dialectic, it is impossible to make a definitive affirmation that unequivocally excludes its opposite or denies its negation.It cannot reach decisions or commitments that are entirely immune to reconsideration. No opinion is so certain that it cannot later be revised.
Everything remains open to contestation. Nothing is so certain that it cannot be refuted, nor so evident that it cannot be doubted. Ethically, this duality is not regarded as reprehensible by Hegel but rather as a moral imperative, intended to avoid rigidity, dogmatism, or imposition (bold by the translator). Yet, one can only imagine the consequences of such an approach for the stability, trustworthiness, serenity, and order of human and social relations—consequences we witness daily.
The Hegelian dialectic, as we have observed, is rooted in the Protagorean principle that whatever appears true to me, or whatever I judge to be true, is true—regardless of its alignment with reality or the actual state of affairs.
This principle justifies presenting what is false or evil as though it were true or good, or for outwardly appearing virtuous while secretly harboring malice. As a result, falsehood and hypocrisy are rendered permissible. In the realm of moral action, it often suffices to create the mere semblance of goodness or to project an image of virtue.
The true state of affairs or what ought to be is rendered irrelevant because, according to this framework, certainty is unattainable. One is perpetually caught between two opposing theses, which encapsulates the essence of Hegelian dialectic. Unlike Aristotelian dialectic, which transitions from opinion to certainty and from dialectic to science, in Hegel's framework, dialectic itself becomes the science.
Hegel adopts this pragmatic understanding of dialectic as praxis or action from Fichte, where, as we know, the "I" posits a "not-I" within itself to assert its identity as "I." Thus, being is not merely thought but also will—a theme that can be traced back to the medieval voluntarism of Ockham and further developed in figures such as Luther, Böhme, Schelling, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche. (bold added by the translator)
Marx, the founder of dialectical materialism, is the most significant heir to this dialectic. For Marx, dialectic is indeed regarded as logic—a driving force behind a necessary and rational process. However, in Marx’s framework, dialectic is not the movement in which matter depends on spirit but rather the opposite: a movement where spirit depends on matter.
Hegel employs dialectic to justify his belief that war is the law of historical progress. For Hegel, progress entails rupture—the negation or destruction of what exists, replaced by something entirely novel and unrelated to its predecessor.
However, Hegel does speak of reconciliation and the enriched restoration of the initial state. He highlights the strength of synthesis, which utilizes the tension between opposites. These ideas are not inherently flawed. Yet, practically, unresolved conflict in Hegel's thought tends to overshadow his undeniable desire for unity, simplicity, peace, harmony, tranquility, and identity.
Why is this the case? As I have often stated, Hegel lacks the analogical and participatory notion of being (bold added by the translator), remaining entrenched in the univocal-equivocal framework of Parmenides and Heraclitus. He fails to grasp the concept of difference and instead perceives only opposition or mistakes opposition for difference.
In Marx, it is not matter that depends on consciousness but consciousness that depends on matter. Marx’s thought represents a recovery of epistemological realism against the ineffectual abstractionism of Hegelian idealism. However, the issue lies in the fact that Marx interprets this dependence not merely intentionally but also ontologically. This conflation of thought with the material being [1] ultimately subjugated the spirit to the dominion of matter.
At the same time, Marx, within the realm of thought and theorization, does not entirely abandon Hegelian antinomianism. This enables him to justify violence, sustain the revolutionary spirit, and devise various tactical reversals that allow the Communist Party to maintain its infallibility and avoid the criticisms of its adversaries.
The Need for a Moral Discipline of Thought
Today, under the guise of freedom of thought, it is increasingly common to employ thinking not as a means to seek, see, know, possess, demonstrate, defend, disseminate, practice, or love the truth, but as a tool, resource, or raw material at our disposal. We mold its form and content according to personal preferences to satisfy selfish desires, dominate others, destroy adversaries, appear zealous, holy, or prophetic while concealing our faults, achieve unmentionable objectives, curry favor with the powerful, gain popular acclaim, or indulge various cravings and desires.
Recently, the concept of creativity has been introduced into the realm of thought. At first glance, it seems to elevate and amplify the energies of the spirit, fostering discovery, novelty, and inventiveness. Yet in reality, it has led to an increase in the arbitrary, undisciplined, capricious, individualistic, and consequently dishonest and harmful use of thought—one that causes every kind of moral and material disorder and damage.
There used to be ecclesial institutions and local and central doctrinal oversight bodies dedicated to issuing warnings, corrections, and condemnations of errors, impostures, falsehoods, defamations, calumnies, scandals, deceptions, frauds, falsehoods, impieties, and heresies. These safeguards, though still present in theory, no longer function as they once did.
The Catholic faithful, lovers of truth, often find themselves bewildered and disheartened amid the chaos of ever-changing, contradictory opinions on fundamental doctrinal issues. They hear renowned theologians openly proclaim doctrines opposed to what they had been taught as immutable and find no one to reassure them of their doubts and concerns.
Rarely do they feel protected or supported by ecclesiastical authorities, who at times falter or remain silent in the face of danger or scandal. As a result, they must defend themselves as best they can, often relying on the uncertain, occasional, or serendipitous assistance of other faithful Catholics, priests, or theologians who are well-prepared, vigilant, and loyal to the Church’s Magisterium.
Paradoxically, never before has there been such an abundance of theological and religious literature as today, nor such a plethora of ecclesial documents. Yet within this vast material, it is exceedingly rare to find guidance capable of exposing and countering the doctrinal errors that profoundly undermine and disturb the life of the Church and society.
In his Logic, Hegel precedes the “doctrine of being” with an introduction where he asks, “With what must science begin?” He then wrestles for fifteen pages with an equivocation he cannot resolve. The confusion lies in conflating the principle of knowledge with two distinct senses: the principle as the act of starting, initiating, or giving a beginning, and the principle as the foundational, immediately evident, and most certain truth upon which knowledge is based. The first question concerns the knower: How does one begin to know? From where does one start (italicized for emphasis by the translator)? The second question pertains to the object of knowledge: What is the first known thing? (Italicized for emphasis by the translator).
We must remember that the exercise of thought is a delicate and significant responsibility. It is not something entirely subject to our will, like a material that can be arbitrarily molded according to our whims. It is not within our rights to use thought as we please, guided solely by personal desires or interests, without considering the consequences for ourselves or others.
On the contrary, the immoral use of thought—its cunning, sophistic, dishonest, or hypocritical manipulation—leads to the loss of our true good. It sets us on a path or conduct that, rather than making use of the talents granted by God or the virtuous inclinations of our nature, turns us into barren fig trees, worthy, as the Gospel parable warns, of being cut down and thrown into the fire.
The requirement to adhere to coherence in thought, to respect the principle of non-contradiction, to avoid self-contradiction, or to resolve apparent contradictions is a precise moral duty. This ensures that what we say is neither nonsensical nor unintelligible and fulfills our obligation to respect the intelligence of our interlocutor. A listener who values truth expects coherent and sensible discourse and has the right to hear arguments that make sense before judging their truth or falsehood. Indeed, for a statement to be true, it is not sufficient for it to be coherent and sensible—it must also conform to reality. A meaningful statement can be either true or false; however, a contradictory statement is invariably false.
In the Introduction to his Logic, Hegel proposes a concept of logic that aims to supplant metaphysics. Why does he undertake this substitution? The root lies in his consideration of an inadequate concept of logic, understood only as formal logic while neglecting the existence of material logic (bold added by the translator). He focuses on logic as the correctness and coherence of reasoning but overlooks logic’s role in ordering the content of knowledge, insofar as it is conceptualized and regulated.
As a result of this oversight, Hegel incorporates into logic subjects that belong to other sciences, while neglecting those that are integral to logic itself. For example, why should mechanisms, chemistry, and vital processes be regarded as matters of logic? What relevance does becoming have to logic? These subjects rightly belong to physics, biology, or history—sciences that engage directly with the nature of reality.
Meanwhile, essential elements of logic are conspicuously absent: where are the predicables and predicaments? Where are the doctrine of demonstration, the principles of proof, and the rules of scientific disputation? What about induction and deduction, inventive and resolutive judgment, sophistical refutations, or the subordination of sciences?
Hegel’s conflation of metaphysics and logic leads to a fundamental error: confusing being (the object of metaphysics) with the concept of being (the object of logic). Being, as such, is neither determined nor undetermined but is the act of the entity, containing virtually every possible determination. Every determinate entity participates in being. In contrast, the concept of being abstracts incompletely from determination. If the abstraction were absolute, it would result in nothingness, seemingly justifying Hegel’s identification of being with nothingness.
Being, as studied by metaphysics, has, as Aristotle observes, many senses; it is analogical and diverse—it is a real being. The metaphysical concept of being involves formal abstraction from material being (formal abstraction), yielding a being of reason. The logical concept of being, by contrast, refers to universal or common being, abstracted from the particularities of individual beings.(total abstraction). Real being is opposed to nothingness. However, logic, which concerns itself with beings of reason, places both the category of real being and nothingness under the concept of being, thereby making nothingness appear as though it were being.
When being in metaphysics is reduced to the logical category of being, the temptation arises to identify being with non-being. This occurs because we are no longer dealing with a real being but with a being of reason, which is used to conceptualize both being and non-being. This is precisely Hegel’s mistake: he reduces metaphysical being to logical being.
Hegel recognizes that logic concerns itself with the conceived being—that is, being as thought or conceptualized. However, as an heir of the idealism that, beginning with Descartes, culminated in Kant and Fichte, he refuses to admit the existence of a reality or being external to thought, independent of thought, to which thought must conform to be true. Consequently, he rejects metaphysics as the knowledge of extramental reality, in line with the Aristotelian realist conception of metaphysics.
For Hegel, logic must replace this metaphysics because, following the Cartesian legacy, the object of thought is not the entity itself but the concept of the entity. Since the entity as thought—the concept of the entity—is the object of logic, it follows that the science of the entity must be logic, not metaphysics. However, this conflation of the entity with its concept leads Hegel to identify being with nothingness, because indeterminacy belongs to the concept of being, not to being itself.
While metaphysics has being as its object, logic has the concept of being as its focus. By concentrating, as Hegel does, exclusively on the determinateness or indeterminateness of the concept of being, one inevitably conflates being with non-being, affirming the same identification of affirmation and negation that Hegel makes. However, this confusion fails to explain becoming, as it purports to do, and instead undermines the clear distinction between reality and negation, truth and error.
Being is solely the “yes” that opposes the “no.” Real being contain all determinations virtually. The concept of being abstracts from everything and may seem to conclude in nothingness. However, confusing being with nothingness is the gravest intellectual catastrophe (bold added by the translator): it is the calamity of nihilism. Astonishingly, a Christian like Hegel is here surpassed by the pagan Aristotle, who proves more faithful to Christ than Hegel himself. Some lament that Pope Francis speaks little of Christ, unaware that one can speak of Him without naming Him and be with Him without realizing it.
We must not disdain becoming but must place it in its proper context. We do not disdain the past or the future, but we need the present. God is neither past nor future but is the Eternal Present. And He is because He has been and will be. We feel the need to build on what is solid, what is firm, what gives security and trust, what gives guarantee, and what resists the power of destruction.
We do not know what to do with fluid concepts. We seek certainty and not self-assurance. We do not want to take for granted what is not. We cannot deny what we are certain of. We want to know what we can err in. We hate to wallow in doubt. We do not want to build on sand but on rock. We do not want to separate to confuse, but to distinguish to unite. We reject rigidity because we want firmness. We reject duplicity and want sincerity.
We feel that it is not dignified to be reeds shaken by the wind. We are fragile, but we want to resist the storms. What is precarious and corruptible is not enough for us. Our life does not end with death. We need words that do not pass away. We need Someone to say to: "You have the words of eternal life."
P. Giovanni Cavalcoli, O.P.
Fontanellato, 2 November 2024
source:
https://padrecavalcoli.blogspot.com/p/dialettica-e-diabolica-il-progetto-di_29.html
Note:
[1] If Hegel reduces matter to thought, Marx reduces thought to matter.