Part 3 - Dialectics and the Diabolical
Hegel's Project Part Three (3/4)
How Hegelian Dialectic Works
For Hegel, dialectic represents a constructive and spiritual affirmation-negation, described as “the absolute method of knowledge and, at the same time, the immanent soul of the content itself”[1]. It is the work of reason:
“Reason is negative and dialectical because it dissolves into nothingness the determinations of the intellect. It is positive because it generates the universal and, within it, comprehends the particular”[2].
“The spirit negates the simple and thus establishes the determinate difference of the intellect. Yet, it also dissolves it, thus being dialectical. However, it does not rest in the nothingness of this result but, in this very result, is equally positive, restoring that initial simplicity, though now as a universal that is concrete in itself”[3].
We observe an extreme exaggeration of antithetical dialectics to the point of annihilating the determinations of the intellect, only to have them mysteriously reemerge—though it is difficult to understand how—thanks to the “immense” and “magical power of the negative.” It remains unclear what this "negative" is in Hegel’s philosophy, ascribed to the spirit, and which seems to exert more influence on reality than the positive itself.
Hegel struggles to ground diversity, limits, difference, and otherness due to his lack of an analogical concept of being. To create distinctions, he relies solely on affirmation and negation, opposing being to non-being. While it is true that to distinguish, one must assert 'this is not that,' this alone is insufficient. If one stops at this point, the other appears merely as the negation of the first, leading to mutual exclusion. How, then, can coexistence within diversity be established? It becomes impossible: the other is reduced to an enemy to be eliminated—either me or them.
Hegel conflates the opposition of being and non-being with the distinction between this and that. The et-et becomes an aut-aut. Distinction leading to union is replaced by opposition leading to conflict. Between me and you, there is no similarity, no analogy, no affinity, no proportionality—only mutual exclusion. One wonders how such principles could ever foster harmony and peace in society.
Conversely, the aut-aut can turn into an et-et. Falsehood and evil gain legitimacy within the "Whole," being redefined as “diversity.” Sodomy? It’s not evil, merely a different sexual orientation. Atheism? It’s not a falsehood, just an alternate opinion. And so forth.
In Hegel, as in Kant, the primacy of reason over the intellect is evident. This is because knowing is not conceived as a form of seeing but as doing, which necessitates a process absent in the pure intuition of the intellect. It is not about progressing toward ever better comprehension of the same object—Absolute—by conforming thought to being. Instead, it involves a self-conscious circularity where everything is negated, and everything returns: the initial position negates itself, the negation negates the negated negation, and the initial position is reaffirmed, enriched by the contribution of the negative. This is Hegel’s dialectical reason, expressed as the work of Spirit. As Hegel himself states:
“In its truth, reason is spirit, and spirit stands above both intellectual reason and rational intellect. It is the negative, which constitutes the quality of both dialectical reason and intellect; spirit negates the simple and thus establishes the determinate difference of the intellect.
Yet, it also dissolves it, thus being dialectical. However, it does not rest in the nothingness of this result, but, in this very result, is equally positive, restoring that initial simplicity, now as a universal that is concrete in itself. Under such a universal, no given particular is merely subsumed; rather, in that determination and its resolution, the particular has already been determined. This spiritual movement, which gives itself its determinacy in its simplicity, and in this gives itself its equality with itself, is the immanent development of the concept. This is the absolute method of knowing and, at the same time, the soul of the content itself”[4].
For Hegel, every entity affirms itself – thesis –, negates itself (the "alienation"), "sublates" itself – antithesis –, negates its negation [5], reaffirms itself (it "elevates" itself), and returns to itself on a higher level (the "progress") – synthesis. This is the famous Hegelian dialectic. However, this higher level is not definitive, as this process occurs in all things, including in God, meaning it is also present in the Absolute. This makes it clear that the Parmenidean Hegel is not as distant from Heraclitus as it might initially appear. If becoming is immanent to the eternal, it is because, ultimately, becoming is eternal.
It should be noted that the opposition between thesis and antithesis remains. What, then, is the outcome? Is there a certain, definitive, and stable victory of good over evil? Is there a triumph of justice over sin? Is there an eternal life free from death? Is there an ultimate truth that cannot be called into question? Is there an absolute good, firm, immutable, incorruptible, that can never be lost? Is there a cessation of suffering?
Hegel’s answer is highly disappointing: there is no solution to these problems because God Himself is entangled in them and cannot resolve them. It is therefore better to accept our fate as it is. Nietzsche was not far from Hegel when he spoke of amor fati.
Hegel also tends to encompass reality within the living being, particularly within the historicity of spirit, which is ultimately the human spirit. He even conceives of God Himself on the model of this spirit. As for Luther, for Hegel too, the true God is the incarnate God, the God-Man, to the point of identifying human nature with divine nature.
Despite all his spirituality, Hegel cannot avoid a materialistic conception of spirit. He understands the action of spirit—an act that is, in itself, immanent to the subject, supratemporal, and supraspatial—according to the model of physical life and spatiotemporal transitive action, immersed in time, mutable, and evolutionary.
For Hegel, it is not merely human opinions that are contradictory; reality itself is inherently contradictory. He, therefore, sought to replace the principle of non-contradiction with the principle of contradiction, without, however, abandoning the concept of identity. For him, 'identity is the identity of identity with non-identity.'
Thus, of everything, one must say that it is so and is not so. One must unite yes with no. One must never express oneself in a clear and absolute way: either yes or no; rather, one must say yes without excluding no, and no without excluding yes. For Hegel, this is inclusive thinking that embraces everything and excludes nothing. Otherwise, we have a dualism that fails to resolve contradictions, does not create the unity of reality, and does not construct the "whole," the totality, the Absolute, the system.
Just as Descartes prided himself on teaching humanity to think, Hegel prided himself on having discovered logic, though the truth is quite different. In reality, neither Descartes is the discoverer of thought, nor Hegel of logic; rather, both merely return to the initial steps of philosophy and to the ancient sophistry of Protagoras, refuted by Aristotle. It must therefore be said that it is Aristotle, perfected by St. Thomas Aquinas, who represents the maturity of philosophy, as endorsed by the Church to this day (bold added by the translator)
What is interesting and characteristic of Hegelian dialectics is precisely this: that he does not abandon the ideal of unity, reconciliation, and identity; but he claims that all of this is achieved precisely through contradiction, in contradiction, beyond contradiction.
Picture someone deftly juggling two clashing passions—letting them spar away while maintaining an air of calm moderation and wise control. Admirable, perhaps, but true virtue doesn’t just referee the fight; it benches the players entirely. Genuine moral triumph doesn’t settle for gritting one’s teeth and keeping chaos at bay. The real win? Eliminating the conflict, so the rebellion of the flesh isn’t just tamed—it’s retired for good.
Another surprising aspect of Hegelian dialectics is that, while it fluidifies concepts and operates on the plane of appearances, it does not present itself as tied to contingency and opinion but claims to demonstrate the logical necessity of everything that happens, including divine life itself. Thus, Hegel addresses the very dogmas of the Christian faith and dares to view them as nothing more than factual knowledge lacking its rationale—a rationale known to the philosopher who understands its necessity.
In this way, Hegel denies the mysteriousness of divine truth. He conceives of Christian revelation as the unveiling of mystery. Therefore, truth, concludes Hegel, is unveiled, not veiled; and where it is unveiled, there is no longer any mystery. Yet we should recall that Hegel professes himself a Lutheran, and so his concept of reason, however distant it might seem from Lutheran irrationalism, is not so far removed: what is the dialectical reason if not a divine reason that negates our human reason? It is the coincidentia oppositorum of which Nicholas of Cusa had already spoken, as a higher coinciding in God of yes and no, above the demands of the principle of non-contradiction, valid for us but from which Divine Reason is free.
In Hegel’s view, the relationship between the individual and society—whether in the context of the State or the Church—is not presented as an interpersonal relationship grounded in the free will of the participants. Instead, it is subsumed into the dialectical framework of relative and absolute, accident and substance, or part and whole, all within the overarching Whole, Totality, Self, or Absolute. Within this system, negation is expressed through the categories of alienation (Entäußerung) and estrangement (Entfremdung)[6].
Demonstrating an evident misunderstanding of the Christian concept of faith, Hegel reduces faith to mere vulgar knowledge about the realm of "representation" (Vorstellung), that is, a knowledge that, when surpassed by understanding the why, assured by "thought" (Denken) or reason, is nothing more than a dialectical mechanism.
In this way, the dogmas of creation, the Trinity, original sin, the Incarnation, redemption, resurrection, and the Church become "figures" (Gestalten) of the dialectical process by which God posits Himself, negates Himself, negates the negation of Himself, and returns to Himself.
Does Hegel Deny the Principle of Non-Contradiction?
The principle of non-contradiction states that it is not possible to affirm and deny, to think and not think, simultaneously, the same thing about the same subject. This is the principle of non-contradiction.
Now, given that our thinking, to be true, must be based on reality, we must affirm that this rule of thought and judgment derives directly from Aristotle's principle, according to which the foundation of knowledge—the most certain thing about which no one can err, and therefore the primordial and fundamental conviction of all, the very thing that encourages us to pursue knowledge—is that it is impossible for a being to be and not be simultaneously and under the same aspect.
Otherwise, knowledge would be impossible because it would lack its object, which is being—that which exists and has its own identity. If being were to negate itself, thought would be paralyzed. Hegel, however, seems to assert the opposite of Aristotle: that being negates itself, and this negation, in turn, negates itself in such a way that the initial being is restored, albeit enriched by what the negation opposed to it. Indeed, negation is a positive force, adding itself as a new positive to the initial positive, thus enriching it with new content.
Aristotle’s first principle concerns being itself, rather than speech or thought. Known as the principle of identity, it asserts that every being has a unique essence: it is itself (idem, ipse) and not something else. Each being is equal to itself and distinct from all others. No concrete, individual entity is entirely identical to another; it is solely identical to itself. While a being may change, its essence—when considered apart from specific circumstances—remains stable and unchanging.
Just as each individual possesses a unique identity card, so too does every being have its inherent identity. From this truth emerges the principle of non-contradiction, which carries a dual moral imperative: we must neither contradict ourselves nor the truth. Instead, we are called to oppose falsehood and align our words with reality, faithfully describing things as they are. This constitutes the precept of coherence, honesty, and sincerity in thought and speech—an essential cornerstone for fostering a healthy and harmonious social life.
Contradiction properly does not pertain to reality, where the identity of the one exists within the diversity of the many. Contradiction, contra-dictio, concerns speech. It is we who may contradict ourselves by forming judgments, reasoning, or assembling concepts that conflict with one another. Reality does not contradict itself; it is what it is.
It is thus necessary to distinguish between contradicting, self-contradiction, and the contradictory. To contradict means to oppose someone or something and can be synonymous with dissent, conflict, or disobedience. In this sense, Christ is called a "sign of contradiction" (Luke 2:34). To contradict oneself is to affirm something and subsequently assert its opposite, resulting in an inconsistency of thought or speech. Such contradictions may arise either intentionally or unintentionally.
The contradictory, however—which is what interests us here—is a thought, concept, or judgment that simultaneously affirms and denies. This is impossible. It is a contradiction in terminis if it is a concept, for example, "an animal that is not animate"; it is a contradiction in iudicio if it is a judgment, for example: "God exists and does not exist."
How, then, did Hegel arrive at what appears to be a denial of such a certain, evident, and foundational principle as the principle of non-contradiction? This principle is universally known and applied—consciously or unconsciously—by anyone who seeks to engage in coherent thought. While one may verbally dissent from it, genuine dissent is impossible, for it cannot truly be thought. It is likely that Hegel intended to refer not to contradiction in its strict logical sense but rather to contrasts, ambiguities, or tensions. Alternatively, he may have failed to articulate his position with sufficient clarity.
Hegel was misled by his idealism, which obscured the crucial distinction between thought and being, between concept and reality. In the process of conceptual formation, we inevitably confront oppositions among concepts. While reality itself cannot harbor contradictions, mutually exclusive concepts do arise, and it is through these very concepts that we must strive to comprehend and articulate the nature of reality.
For example, the concepts of life and death, though contrary, evoke one another. Only in reality can life exist without death. Similarly, the concept of man is not the concept of animal. Yet we say that Paul is simultaneously an animal and a man. How can we say this? In Paul’s real identity, the two concepts identify with one another, as "rational" is the specific difference of "animal."
Furthermore, Hegel, overly captivated by the dynamic nature of becoming while striving for unity, failed to grasp the true identity of being. Trapped in the tension between being and non-being, he came to believe that truth and reality could only be achieved if being and non-being coexisted and were affirmed simultaneously, even in their contradiction.
Hegel frequently employs contradictory expressions, likely in an attempt to articulate difference, distinction, otherness, changeability, and multiplicity. He seems to have been unfamiliar with the language of analogy, which would have enabled him to express these concepts more clearly and unequivocally without creating the impression of self-contradiction.
Some have therefore argued that, ultimately, Hegel does not discard Aristotle's principle of non-contradiction; instead, he aims to resolve contradictions to achieve unity. However, a careful reading of his method for establishing unity reveals that it is not about fleeing from or avoiding contradiction, as that would amount to "succumbing to it." Rather, Hegel advocates for "dominating" contradiction, which means holding opposites firm in their opposition, maintaining their tension without enforcing their mutual exclusion.
Moreover, Hegel states that dialectical negation is not a total negation of the initial thesis, such as would result in nothingness. It does not eliminate everything but only what opposes progress; that is, it negates a specific determination that impedes progress while preserving the subject, which is affirmed as the origin of the negation. Thus, the subject is reaffirmed, enriched, and developed. But this reasoning is unconvincing. When Hegel speaks of being, he does not make this distinction but speaks simply of nothingness as the negation of being tout court. Does this mean that being is identical to non-being?
For Hegel, the Absolute itself conflicts with itself. But—he assures us—there is no need to worry because, for him, this is reality, this is truth. In the Absolute, everything is reconciled: the possible and the impossible, the rational and the irrational, being with non-being, truth with falsehood, good with evil, Christ with Belial, paradise with hell.
Truth, as he says, is the "whole," that is, the synthesis of all these things. What seems true is true. This was Protagoras’s principle, already refuted by Aristotle: what is true for me is false for you. What was true yesterday is false today. This is epistemological relativism and subjectivism. It is his principle of the "fluidity" of concepts, while he simultaneously identifies the thing with the concept of the thing, being with thought, the ideal with the real.
Hegel recognized the value of being, essence, identity, unity, universality, simplicity, eternity, substance, the Absolute, and spirit. He sought to rationally explain becoming, the changes in natural phenomena, ideas, opinions, human conduct, the life of the spirit, and the progress of knowledge. He perceived the grand and impressive reality of human history. He sought to explain the opposition between being and non-being, truth and falsehood, good and evil.
Aristotle had already foreseen Hegelian thought in his formidable critique of Protagoras. Here, I extract only a few arguments from it, but it deserves to be read in its entirety. This critique unfolds throughout Chapter V of Book IV of the Metaphysics, following his refutation in Chapter IV of various opponents of the principle of non-contradiction through numerous arguments:
"Protagoras’ doctrine stems from the same conviction, and thus both doctrines necessarily stand or fall in the same way. For if all opinions and all sensory appearances are true, they must necessarily all be true and all false at the same time. For many people hold opposing beliefs, and each considers those who do not share their opinions to be in error. From this necessarily follows the conclusion that the same thing both is and is not; and if this is so, it also necessarily follows that all opinions are true.
Indeed, those who are correct and those who are mistaken hold mutually opposing opinions; but if things themselves are as they claim, then all will be in the right. It is evident, therefore, that both doctrines stem from the same reasoning...
Those who embraced this conviction due to certain difficulties did so based on their observation of sensory things. They arrived at the belief that opposites and contradictions can coexist, seeing that opposites derive from the same thing. For if it were not possible for what is not to come into being, both opposites must have already pre-existed together in that same thing...
Being is said in two senses. Therefore, in one sense, it is possible for something to arise from non-being, while in another sense, it is not possible; and it is also possible for the same thing to both be and not be, but not in the same respect. For it is possible for the same thing to simultaneously contain opposites in potentiality, but not in actuality." [7] (Metaphysics, IV.5)
Did Hegel truly understand what Aristotle intended by his principle of non-contradiction when he opposed it with his principle of contradiction? And have we truly understood Hegel when accusing him of denying Aristotle's principle of non-contradiction?
Aristotle articulates the principle of non-contradiction as follows: "It is impossible for the same thing to simultaneously belong and not belong to the same thing, in the same respect" [8](Metaphysics, IV.3). The entire clash between Aristotle and Hegel can be summed up in the following simple expressions: Aristotle says, "Nothing can simultaneously be thus and not be thus." Hegel, on the other hand, says, "Everything can simultaneously be thus and not be thus."
Who is right? For Hegel, things are as he claims. But if this is so, even for him, they are so and cannot simultaneously not be so. Thus, Hegel refutes himself. Hegel, who professes to be a Christian, here fails to imitate Christ and is surpassed by a pagan, Aristotle. As Saint Paul observes, in Christ, there is no "yes" and "no," but only "yes" (cf. 2 Corinthians 1:19-20). How is it that the Christian Hegel is surpassed by the pagan Aristotle? Because one who reasons honestly, even if they do not know Christ, is more Christian than one who reasons dishonestly, even if they know all the truths of faith.
End of Part Three (3/4)
P. Giovanni Cavalcoli OP
Fontanellato, 2 November 2024
Source:
https://padrecavalcoli.blogspot.com/p/dialettica-e-diabolica-il-progetto-di_8.html#_ftnref1
References
[1] Scienza della logica (The Science of Logic), Edizioni Laterza, Bari 1984, p.7.
[2] Ibid., p.6.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Scienza della logica (The Science of Logic), op. cit., pp.6-7.
[5] Hegel also sometimes divides this second moment into two: negation and the negation of the negation, before the final moment of reconstituting the thesis and returning to the beginning, so that the moments of the dialectic increase from three to four.
[6] Georges M.-M. Cottier, L’athéisme du jeune Marx et ses origines hégéliennes (The Atheism of Young Marx and Its Hegelian Origins), Vrin, Paris 1959.
[7] Metafisica (Metaphysics), Book Gamma, Ch. V, Edizioni Loffredo, Napoli 1968, pp.307-308.
[8] Metafisica (Metaphysics), Book Gamma, Ch. III, 1005b20, op. cit., p.298.