The Question of Negative Theology – Part Two

Not an Abdication of Intelligence, but an Avoidance of Presumption

How to Speak of God

In today’s world, many either never speak of God, or do so in an unrestrained, misguided, or deceitful manner—without proper preparation, out of mere habit, lacking prudence, conviction, or discretion. Some speak of God out of convenience, to sell books, to appear as a genius or prophet, out of sheer obligation, to justify moral laxity, to stir pride or passions, to incite hatred, to sow division, to obstruct progress, to subvert decency and social order, or to undermine faith and the sense of the sacred. It seems incredible, but this is how far the cunning of the devil and the resources of duplicity and hypocrisy can reach—employing theism, even mysticism, to promote atheism and immorality.

The use of the word "God" is a delicate matter. This word arises spontaneously from the soul that is honest and devout. Yet, it must also be learned and used with discretion, intelligence, prudence, wisdom, and pure intention. In many situations, silence is more appropriate. One must not invoke God’s name frivolously, recklessly, or driven by passion.

Theological preaching schools are scarce. While there is much talk of pastoral work and evangelization, the content often remains limited to biblical exegesis, hagiography, anecdotes, social themes, humanistic and psychological concerns, and moral discussions. Even the Order of Preachers, specifically founded for this purpose, often seems to have settled into this current trend.

To speak fittingly, wisely, and effectively of God, particular attention must be paid to His name and names—how He is named and how and with what terms we should address Him. It is necessary to praise Him rightly and avoid offending Him, enabling us to speak of Him with the dignity and reverence He deserves. This means knowing what we ought to think of Him, how to conceive of Him, and what attributes and properties to ascribe to Him.

There are three kinds of divine attributes. First, we must distinguish between essential and operational attributes. The essential attributes belong to God’s very essence and are necessary: infinity, substantiality, spirituality, eternity, thought, wisdom, omnipotence, freedom, immutability, and impassibility.

The operational attributes, on the other hand, presuppose the existence of creation, which is a contingent work of God’s omnipotent will and divine wisdom. These attributes would not exist if God had not created the world. They include being Creator, provident, loving, just, loyal, faithful, and merciful [1]. These operational attributes form the basis for the divine attributes related to humanity: intelligibility, lovability, adorability, trustworthiness, credibility, and fearfulness.

One must place oneself in the horizon of spiritual language to express spiritual matters in spiritual terms (cf. 1 Cor 2:13), rising from the carnal to the spiritual plane, so as not to profane or trivialize the things of God. The language employed should be drawn from metaphysics, not from physics. Psychological terminology may be used, but without falling into anthropomorphisms, for God is pure spirit and not a compound of spirit and body. Metaphors, comparisons, symbols, poetry, analogies, parables, myths, paradoxes, and narratives may certainly be employed, but always in a way that elevates the listener’s mind from the sensible to the imaginable, and from the imaginable to the intelligible.

In speaking of God, one must avoid both timidity, which leads to stumbling, hesitation, stammering, and incoherence, and audacity or recklessness, which leads to exaggerated claims and bravado, designed to impress an astonished audience with the speaker's apparent genius.

The theologian who speaks of God in a pedestrian and pedantic manner, as if drawing up an expense report or listing cars in a parking lot, should rather pursue a career as an accountant or traffic warden. The theologian who plays the actor would be better suited for the stage. The one who knows only how to tell stories should dedicate himself to writing novels.

As for those who evoke mystical emotion because they are unable to formulate a theological argument, it might be more appropriate for them to focus on disciplining their sexual affections. The theologian who speaks obscurely should first ask himself whether he truly understands what he is saying.

Rules for Applying the Principle of Causality

A fundamental aspect of speaking about God is the ability to skillfully apply the first principles of speculative reason, particularly the principle of causality, which leads the mind to the discovery of God's existence. It must be understood that causality is a transcendental property of being, encompassing both the capacity to cause and cause by essence. In contrast, being an effect is a categorial predicate that belongs only to caused beings.

When attempting to prove God's existence to a skeptic, it is necessary to first agree on what is meant by the word "God." By this term, we mean "the first cause." We then ask: does a first cause exist?

In answering this question, the following rules must be respected:

1. The cause is superior to the effect and precedes it.

2. The cause (the greater) cannot arise from the effect (the lesser) (against Teilhard de Chardin).

3. The cause does not always produce the effect, as a free cause may abstain from doing so (against Spinoza).

4. The cause elevates, increases, develops, and nurtures the effect.

5. There exists not only an absolute cause but also a secondary cause (against Severino).

6. The cause cannot cause itself (against Descartes).

7. The effect resembles the cause and participates in the being of the cause.

8. The effect can be compared to the cause; it is in harmony with the cause.

9. The effect is relative to the cause; it is ordered to the cause.

10. The proper effect is the result of a necessary and proportionate cause.

11. The proper effect is caused intrinsically, not accidentally.

12. The effect is virtually pre-contained in the cause.

13. The effect is sufficiently explained by a sufficient cause (Leibniz).

14. The effect is not simply a post hoc, but a propter hoc (against Hume).

15. Chance does not exist because it denies the existence of a cause for the effect (against Monod).

16. The effect cannot contradict the cause, nor vice versa (against Hegel).

17. No effect arises from nothing except that which is created by the first cause (against nihilism).

18. No effect exists without a cause, as this would be contradictory (Bontadini).

Once it is demonstrated that God exists, it becomes clear that the first cause must be a necessary being, one that can not exist, a being whose essence coincides with its existence. Indeed, if it did not exist, nothing would be explained, and nothing would exist. Thus, God includes existence within His very essence; otherwise, He would not be God, nor would He be the first cause.

This identity of being and essence is His essence. But we come to know this only after discovering, through the principle of causality, that God exists. The predicate of existence is intrinsic to the divine essence. It is not possible to conceive of a God who does not necessarily exist. But this is something we learn only after proving that He exists.

Thus, the so-called "ontological" proof of Anselm, based on the idea that the concept of God is that of a necessarily existing being, does not prove that God exists. It presupposes that we already know that in God, essence coincides with existence—something that is deduced or learned only after demonstrating, through causality (Rom 1:20), that God exists.

Anselm's proof attempts to demonstrate God's existence based on an essential property that is deduced from the prior knowledge that God exists, which is derived from the application of the principle of causality, beginning from the visibilia of this world (Rom 1:20).

The Problem of the First Cause

What does it mean to cause, and what is the relationship between reason and causality? To cause means to produce, to move, to bring into being, to effect the transition from potentiality to actuality, from the possible to the actual, from the ideal to the real; it means to determine, to order, to create, to attract as a goal or an end.

Reason, on its part, is the mind's power to order and to know. It does so through deduction, argumentation, and reasoning. It provides reasons, explaining the "why" of what it does or of what exists. When reason inquires into the cause of the existence of things—whether of the self, the world, or the universe—it realizes something fundamental: these things could not have brought themselves into being. They could not have caused themselves. Reason, then, understands with absolute certainty that they must have been caused or created by something beyond them. This cause must be sufficient and absolute. Importantly, this cause does not itself require an explanation. This cause, reason is called the first cause, or "God."

Thus, theism arises. Polytheism, on the other hand, is a sign of a primitive mentality, immersed in imagination and incapable of rising to the level of pure intelligibility—a crude and sensual mindset, subject to the regime of myth rather than that of logos.

Polytheism does show a glimmer of rationality, as it assigns a cause (a god or Platonic idea) to each of the great phenomena of nature; it understands that every value and every ideal must have a principle or patron. However, it fails to abstract from beings the notion of a universal and transcendental contingent being and thus does not inquire into the cause of contingent being or the cause or principle (archè) of the world.

Polytheism reflects an insufficient concept of divinity. The true God can only be one. It is true that the great categories of being, the various values or kinds of reality, each have their own principle. But this is not yet the level of the divine. The true God must be above all categories and must explain the totality of things, contingent being as such. Moreover, the true God must virtually contain within His essence all perfections. He cannot admit alongside Himself another god who possesses what He does not.

Therefore, by applying the principle of causality radically, addressing the cause of the world’s existence, human reason arrives at the monotheistic affirmation—that is, the existence of a single God, Lord of the universe. Moreover, this God is not only the Lord of the universe. Still, he is also conceived as a personal being, the creator of man, to whom man thus renders worship—this is religion—and by obeying whom man attains happiness—this is morality.

Reason perceives that God is "a singular spiritual substance," as Vatican I declared (Denz. 3001), meaning that God is a person who has created us in His image and likeness. But who is this person? Can we define Him? Certainly, we call Him "God" because He is the universe's first cause and ultimate end.

We can define specific essences, but not individual ones. We can only describe them. If defining the human person by genus and specific difference is impossible, how much more difficult must it be for the angelic or divine person! Specific essences can be abstracted. We can derive humanity from man, and divinity from God. But we cannot abstract individuality, or what Blessed Duns Scotus called haecceitas, from the hoc ("this"), because individuality is not an universal.

However, when it comes to defining God’s essence or nature, we can take the concept of being as the genus and obtain the specific difference by dividing being into finite and infinite, mutable and immutable, passible and impassible, spiritual and material, composite and simple, substantial and accidental, absolute and relative, singular and multiple. God is an infinite, immutable, impassible, spiritual, simple, absolute, singular, and substantial being.

Certainly, we can develop a true understanding of God. Even if our concept of divinity originates from a pagan deity, we can purify and elevate it, using it as a standard to distinguish the true God from false ones.

Once we have understood who the true God is, we then desire to know His divine personality in its own original identity and singularity and to enter into a relationship with Him. We understand that a person—whether human, angelic, or divine—is inherently intelligible.

But how do we present it to our intellect? How do we intuit it? Who do we have before us? We cannot conceptualize it. Yet, we can recognize or perceive [2] the presence of God, pray to Him, speak to Him. We feel when He speaks to us. How does this happen? We also know that our intellect usually grasps the individual by appealing to sensory experience. When encountering a pure spirit—whether angelic or divine—we must go beyond anything sensory or imaginable. This is the essence of negative theology, requiring us to engage in pure thought and intellect to truly stand before the pure Spirit.

Thus, we find the three monotheistic religions—Christianity, Judaism, and Islam—united in their worship of the one true God. This God is the creator of heaven and earth: eternal, omnipotent, wise, just, and merciful. These religions also share the possibility of speaking in unison on matters of theology and natural religion. However, Christianity has a unique mission from God. Its role is to instruct and enlighten all others with the Word of God. This Word has been revealed to the world by the Son of God, the Incarnate Word, and the Father's Logos. Through the power of the Holy Spirit, He abundantly bestows the gifts of grace, triumphing over the forces of darkness.

A witness to the God of reason and natural religion is the Great Architect of the Universe in Freemasonry. The Masonic God rejects atheism as "foolishness," according to Anderson’s London Constitutions of 1723, but He is not a personal God; He is the symbol of rationality governing both human rationality, expressed in the triad of equality, fraternity, and liberty.

Freemasonry does not espouse any of the revelations claimed by religions, yet in lodge meetings, the "sacred book" is open, allowing each revealed religion to imbue it with the content corresponding to its faith. Nevertheless, the Masonic notion of God does not grant objective value to divine revelation, which is not considered supernatural or suprarational, but merely a contingent cultural manifestation. This leads Freemasonry into a form of Gnosticism, as it denies the existence of knowledge higher than reason.

Furthermore, it is not difficult to realize—as Hegel was surely aware—that the events and facts of nature and history are caused, ordered, organized, and logically connected, even those that seem disordered, disconnected, irrational, or accidental. Even evil, which seems rationally inexplicable and almost absurd, still has a cause and, therefore, an explanation. Thus, it has a remedy and can be overcome. Reason can tell us why evil exists and where it originates, though it is much more difficult—if not impossible—to eradicate it through reason alone.

Kant and the Problem of God's Existence

It is well known that Kant, in his famous Critique of Pure Reason, sought to provide a definitive clarification and foundation for the objectivity, certainty, and truth of human knowledge by having reason reflect upon itself. He examined the principles, origins, methods, limits, scope, possibilities, duties, rights, demands, purposes, and the nature of human reason.

The result was a robust foundation for the natural and phenomenological sciences, as well as for mathematics, yet it failed to establish metaphysics. Kant overlooked the common notion of being (ens), which is abstracted from our experience of sensible reality.

Lacking the notion of being (ens), and even more so that of existence (esse), Kant lost sight of the transcendental properties of being, along with the first principles of speculative reason: the principles of identity, causality, and finality. These principles denote the three fundamental orientations of being: towards itself (identity), towards a principle (cause), and an end (finality).

Kant confused the ontological transcendental with Descartes' cogito, thus inaugurating a concept of reason closed within its self-consciousness. As a result, Kant failed to address the fundamental question of the ontological cause of reason, which is divine Reason itself. In this way, human reason began to consider itself as absolute, and from Kant's concept of reason emerged Hegel’s idea, which identifies Reason in its entirety with God himself.

Moreover, in his laborious and convoluted inquiries—spanning hundreds of pages—into the existence of God, Kant encountered numerous obstacles: antinomies, misunderstandings, uncertainties, hypotheses, circular reasoning, paralogisms, and hesitations. Despite all this, he ultimately failed to establish the concept of a first cause. It truly begs the question: why did he write a 700-page book, The Critique of Pure Reason, only to deny the existence of a first cause—the very conclusion that natural reason, and all religions, arrive at? To fail in this regard is for reason to fail in its fundamental purpose and its pursuit of truth.

Kant, as we know, could not develop a metaphysical, analogical concept of causality, remaining stuck in a univocal notion of causality limited to the realm of phenomena. Hence, it is no surprise that he lamented the impossibility of reaching God through causality—indeed, it is evident that God is not a phenomenon.

At least Kant had some awareness of this! But really, how did he manage to overlook the existence of finite spirit? And just what gives the finite spirit its being? From itself? If that were true, it would already be God! But if it’s finite, how could it possibly be God? It’s mind-boggling that in his 700-page odyssey, Kant never bothered to tackle such an obvious question for anyone daring enough to write a comprehensive treatise on reason!

If asking who caused the first cause is nonsensical, it is nonetheless sensible to ask why one must posit a first cause and whether it is possible to regress infinitely in the chain of causes, particularly since such an idea poses no difficulty in the case of physical causes.

Yet, the radical demand that reason feels when faced with the existence of the world and of itself concerns the very existence of the world and of itself. It is not enough to posit a chain of caused causes. A caused cause does not sufficiently explain the existence of its effect. One must posit a cause that is only a cause—this is the first cause. A cause is needed to explain the totality of the effect, including its very existence. This cause is what everyone calls "God." No one refers to the first cause by another name. One may call a secondary cause "God," but everyone refers to the first cause as "God."

Correspondingly, practical reason, which moves the will, demands an ultimate end of action. Yet here too, a similar problem arises as with efficient causality: why is there a need to admit an end? Is it not true that humans and natural agents, upon reaching one end, pursue another, indefinitely? Is it not true that human progress has no end? Undoubtedly, as in the domain of action, of doing, and efficiency, there are no obstacles to positing the infinity of causes of motion or becoming, just as in the pursuit of ends, we find no impediments to at least thinking of an infinite chain of finite ends, a succession of ends leading to further ends, ad infinitum.

Where should the agent stop? And if it were to stop, wouldn’t that be death? Can one conceive of an agent that does not aim at an end? An entity that does not act? Only abstractions do not act, but every real being acts. The problem lies in whether there can be an end that completely satisfies the active force, the tension, the aspiration, or the need of the agent so that it is fully satisfied, has accomplished everything it can do and was created for, and thus feels no need to seek something else or something better. Certainly, there exists a maximum or an optimum; the agent cannot desire anything better once it has obtained or realized it.

The human spirit, though finite, is not content with the finite and mutable. It needs the Infinite, the Eternal, and the Absolute. It needs God. And if it does not regard God as the absolute, it absolutizes the creature or itself. However, this need for the absolute, for the highest good or ultimate end, becomes unhealthy and disastrous if the human spirit desires to become infinite itself or regards itself as infinite. This is the gravest illusion to which a human can fall victim, an illusion driven by pride and the devil. From this arise all atheist, Hindu, idealist, pantheist, and gnostic philosophies.

Moreover, the first cause must possess infinitely and most eminently the created perfections, which can undergo infinite increase and thus reach infinite perfection. These are spiritual values because material ones, no matter how magnified, retain an imperfection in their essence, such as becoming, corruptibility, and divisibility, which are intrinsic to bodies and the like.

For this reason, they are fundamentally bound by insurmountable limitations. They can only exist virtually within the essence of the first cause, which is identical to it; outside of this essence, existing independently, they cannot attain infinity. However, the finite spirit is open to a potential infinite deepening through knowledge and love. The One, the True, the Good, the Beautiful—these can indeed be infinite. Hence, theological predication by eminence, for which we use absolute superlatives.

Leopardi's nihilism, which asserts that everything comes from nothing and returns to nothing, is striking in a mind like his, so intelligent and sensitive, religiously educated as a child. It is difficult to understand how such an acute mind could be blinded by such folly. What could have happened to him?

P. Giovanni Cavalcoli, OP

Fontanellato, June 5, 2021

source:

https://padrecavalcoli.blogspot.com/p/la-questione-della-teologia-negativa_15.html

Notes:

1. The Author challenges Cardinal Kasper's assertion that mercy is an essential attribute of the divine nature. Kasper's work, Misericordia. Concetto fondamentale del Vangelo. Chiave della vita cristiana, published in Brescia in 2015, posits mercy as central to the nature of God, but the Author here disputes that notion, implying it may not be as foundational as Kasper suggests.

2. Husserl's Phenomenology and the Concept of Einfühlung: The term Einfühlung (often translated as "empathy", Ed.) from Husserl’s phenomenology is introduced to illustrate how we recognize and intuit the presence of another soul. While we can describe its characteristics conceptually, we do not fully grasp it through mere concepts but through a direct intuitive experience. The Author draws an analogy to how we perceive God—not conceptually but through an intuitive sense of His presence. This intuition is distinct from comprehending God's essence, which would equate to the beatific vision. Instead, it’s an interior awareness of God's presence without full intellectual apprehension of His nature.